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820 PLU:\IER PLUMER C.2l1 
A. No. 24197. In Bank. 
MARGARE'l' h PLUMEH, Hespondent, v. EVERETT T. 
PI_~UMEH, Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-
Effect of Agreement of Parties.-~When an order for support 
payments in a divorce decree is based on an agreement of the 
parties, the possibility of subsequent modification of the order 
without the consent of both parties depends on the nature 
of the agreement. 
[2] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.--vVhere husband and wife agree to a 
simple division of their property or agree that one party is 
to receive the lion's share of the marital property and the 
other money payments, not in satisfaction of a statutory right 
to support but solely to equalize the division of the marital 
property, the agreement is a true property settlement uncon-
cerned with rights and duties as to support; the court may 
approve such agreement and in addition order the payment of 
alimony, and such order is subject to modification on an ade-
quate showing of changed circumstances. ( Civ. Code, § 139.) 
[3] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-Where husband and wife agree that 
the wife will receive specified money payments in lieu of the 
statutory right to ~upport, such au agreement is a true "ali-
mony" or "support and maintenanct," and a sup-
port order based thereon is modiliable uu an ad(•tpmte showing 
of changed cin,umstanees. 
[4a-4c] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Ef-
fect of Agreement of Parties.-Where husband and wife enter 
into a hybrid agreement to settle not only property rights but 
rights and duties as to support, the possibility of modifying 
an order for support based on such an agreement without the 
consent of the parties depends on whether the provisions for 
division of property and the provisions for support are sever-
able rather than integrated; if they are integrated the order 
may not he modified unless the parties have provided for or 
agreed to such a modification. 
[5] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties: 
Modification of Allowance.-An agreement betwePn husband 
and wife is integrated if the parties have agreed that the 
See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 9, 10] Divorce, § :21G(l); Di~ 
,·oree, ~§ 203, 216(1); [6~8] DivorcP, ~ 203. 
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to division of property and those relating 
reciprocal consideration, since the sup-
port provisions are then necessarily part and parcel of a 
division of property; such an agreement would be destroyed 
by subsequPnt modification of a support order based thereon 
without the consPnt of the parties, and it is immaterial whether 
or not the marital property is divided equally, that the amount 
of the marital property is small, or that the agreement calls 
for payments for "support" or "alimony." 
[6] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
An agreement between husband and wife providing that their 
purpose is to reach a final settlement of their rights and duties 
with respect to both property and support, that they intend 
each provision to be in consideration for each of the other 
provisions, and that they waive all rights arising out of the 
marib l relationship except those Pxpressly set out in the 
ngrPement, will he deemed eonc]usive evidence that they in-
t<'nded an intf'grated agreement. 
[7] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.~ 
~Where husband and wife may he uncertain as to the value or 
legal ownership of property, or uncertain which of them is 
entitled to a divorcf' and on what grounds and therefore 
uncertain as to thf'ir legal rights with respect to support and 
the division of property, an agreement for a specified division 
of property and sperified support payments settling such un-
certainties is integrated in the absence of convincing proof 
that they intended it to be severable. 
[8] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.~ 
\Vhere an agreemmt hetwf'en husband and wife deals both 
with rights to marital property and rights to snpport, and 
thf'y haYe set forth their purpose "to effect a final and com-
plete sdt!Pment of their ... rights ... with reference to 
their maritnl status and to each other" and have released each 
other from all claims arising out of the marital relationship 
Pxerpt as provided in the agreement, the inference is clear 
that the parties intended an integrated agreement; it is not 
necessary that they expressly recite such an intent when thf' 
ngref'ment itself mnkes the intent clear. 
[9] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-A provision in an ngreement be-
twePn husband and wife that "For purposes of this agreement 
no earnings of 'Wife or other income obtained by her shall 
he eonsidpred as a 'changed condition' and taken into consider-
ation in connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain 
a reduction in payment for support of \Vife or said child, ... 
except such portion of said earnings or other income as shall 
exceed the gross average monthly sum of Two Hundred Fifty 
822 
on an adequate 
income did not 
increase in her income would 
condition. 
[10] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-A reduction the 
ments for wife would violate 
between the that 
to Wife shall 
their modification. 
APPEAL from an order of the of 
1e\ngeles County dismissing application fot' modification 
judgment of divorce. Elmer D. Doyle, Reversed. 
Fogel, Mcinerny & vVest, ,James E. Jr., and Steven 
Edmondson for Appellant. 
Hahn, Ross & Saunrlers anrl B. Lloyd Saunders for 
spondenL 
TRAYNOR. J.-On 
fendant entered into an agreement "to effect 
complete settlement of their rct>peetiYe 
port, alimony and custody of their child with reference 
their marital statns and to eaeh other.'' Pa 
the agreement obligates defendant to pay 
month ''for the support 
custody of said child until he sl1all reach the age of 
" Paragraph nine provides that defendant shall pay 
plaintiff an additional $200 per month ''as alimony for her 
support and maintenance .... ' In 
each party releases the other from all 
claims and rights to support, separate 
court costs, attorneys' fees, and all property 
kind except as provirled for in the ""'''r>r>m 
graphs deal with the division of marita1 
ment of debts, future education of the 
and modification of the ;mpport 
decree of divorce 
in defendant's income as a basis for 
the matter to a commissioner, 
who found in favor, the court dismissed the order 
to show cause. Defendant appeals, contending that the agree-
ment not and that even if it is, a material 
reduction in his income is a ground for modification within 
the express of the agreement. 
[1] When an order for support payments in a divorce 
decree is based on an agreement of the parties, the possibility 
of modification of the order without the consent 
of both parties depends on the nature of the agreement 
Prior to Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621 [177 P.2d 265], the 
to classify all separation agreements either 
settlement" agreements or as "alimony" or 
and maintenance" agreements. (Ettlinger v. Ett-
3 Cal.2d 172, 177-179 [ 44 P .2d 540) ; Puckett v. 
21 Cal.2d 833, 841-842 [136 P.2d 1] ; Hough v. Hough, 
26 Cal.2d 605, 614-615 [160 P.2d 15] .) If the underlying 
was a "property settlement" agreement, the "sup-
, order could not be modified without the consent of 
modifiable upon a 
v. Ettlinger, supra, 3 Cal.2d at 177-
if the underlying agreement was for "ali-
and maintenance,'' the support order was 
of changed circumstances. (Hough 
Cal.2d at 612.) In Adams v. Adams, supra, 26 
supra, 29 Ca1.2d at and in Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal. 
recognized that hybrid agree-41 P.2d 
ments to settle not only "'""·"n.'"''1 " rights but rights and duties 
as to support are sui nc.,,,., .• o 
[2] rrhe are free to limit their agreement to prop-
may, for example, agree to a simple divi-
PL C:\1 EH v. PLlLI!ER 0.2d 
sion. Or they may agree that one is to rcecive the lion's 
share of the marital property and the other money payments, 
not in satisfaction of a statutory right to support, but solely 
to equalize the division of the marital property; such an 
agreement is a true property settlement unconcerned with 
rights and duties as to support. The court, therefore, may 
approve the agreement and in addition order the payment of 
alimony (Adams v. Adams, supra, 29 Cal.2d at G25), and such 
an order is subject to modification on an adequate showing 
of changed circumstances. ( Civ. Code, § 139.) 
[3] The parties are likewise free to limit their agreement 
to their rights and duties as to support. They may, for 
example, agree that the wife will receive specified money 
payments in lieu of the statutory right to support. Such an 
agreement is a true" alimony" or" support and maintenance" 
agreement, and under the rule of Hongh v. Hough, supra, 26 
Cal.2d 605, 612, a support order based thereon is modifiable 
on an adequate showing of changed circumstances. 
[4a] Frequently, however, the parties enter into a hybrid 
agreement as in the Adams and Dexter cases and in 111essenger 
v. 111essenger, 46 Cal.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988]. The possibility 
of modifying an order for support based on such an agree-
ment without the consent of the parties, depends upon whether 
the provisions for division of property and the provisions for 
support are severable rather than integrated. If they are 
integrated the order may not be modified unless the parties 
have provided for or agreed to such a modification. (Dexter v. 
Dexter, supra, 42 Cal.2d at 40.) 
[5] .An agreement is integrated if the parties have agreed 
that the provisions relating to division of property and the 
provisions relating to support constitute reciprocal consider-
ation. The support provisions are then necessarily part and 
parcel of a division of property. Such an agreement would 
be destroyed by subsequent modification of a support order 
based thereon, without the consent of the parties. (Dexter v. 
Dexter, supra, 42 Cal.2d at 41-42; Messenger v. Messenger, 
snpra, 46 Cal.2d at 62G, G27-f528; Herda v. Herda, ante. 
pp. 228, 231-232 [308 P.2d 705].) It is immaterial whether 
or not the marital property is divided equally. (Dexter v. 
Dexter, snpra, 42 Cal.2d at 43; Messenger v.111essenger, snpra, 
46 Cal.2d at 627-628.) It is immaterial that the amount of 
the marital property is small. (Herda v. Herda, supm, ante, 
at p. 232.) It is lik('Wise immaterial that tlw agT(•emellt 
calls for payments for "support" or "alimony." (111essenger 
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v. llfessenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 624-625 and eases there 
cited.) 
[4b] A support ord('r based upon an integrated agreement 
may be modified if the parties so provide. (Flynn v. Flynn, 
42 Cal.2d 55, 61 [265 P.2d 865].) Absent such a provision, 
it cannot. [6] An agreement providing that the purpose of 
the parties is to reach a final settlement of their right,; and 
duties with respect to both property and support, that they 
intend each provision to be in consideration for each of the 
other provisions, and that they waive all rights arising out 
of the marital relationship except those expressly set out in 
the agreement, will be deemed conelusive evidence that the 
parties intended an integrated agreement. (llfessenger v. 
llfessenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 628; Anderson v. llfart, 47 Cal. 
2d 274, 279 [303 P.2d 539]; Herda v. Herd.a, s11pra, ante, 
at p. 232.) Even absent one or more of the foregoing pro-
visions, there may be other proof that the parties intended an 
integrated agreement. (Dexter v. Dexter, S1tpra, 42 Cal.2d 
at 41.) [7] Thus, the parties may be uncertain as to the 
value or legal ownership of property. They may be uncertain 
which of them is entitled to a divorce and on what ground,; 
and therefore uncertain as to their legal rights with respect 
to support and the division of property. An agreement for a 
specified division of property and specified support paymentR 
settling such uncertainties is integrated in the absence of con-
vincing proof that the parties intended it to be severable. 
(See Dexter v. Dexter, supra, 42 Cal.2d at 43; 111 essenger v. 
111 essenger, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 627-628.) 
[8] Under the foregoing rules the agreement in the present 
case is clearly integrated. It deals both with rights to marital 
property and rights to support. The parties have set forth 
their purpose "to effect a final and complete settlement of 
their ... rights ... with reference to their marital status 
and to each other." They have released each other from all 
elaims arising out of the marital relationship except as pro-
vided in the agreement. The inference is clear that the 
parties intended an integrated agreement. It iR not necessary 
that the parties expressly recite such an intent when the 
agreement itself makes the intent clear. (Dexter v. Dexter, 
supra, 42 Cal.2d at 41.) 
[4c] Our conclusion tl1at tlw agTeNncnt is integr·ated, how-
evrr, does not disposr of the ease, for, as noted earlier, an 
order for support based upon au iutegrated agreement may be 
modified if the parties have expressly so provided. (Flynn v. 
826 C.2d 
42 CaL2d at 61.) [9] of the 
:"For purposes of this no ean1~ 
of "Wife or other· income obtained her shall be consid .. 
ered as a ' condition' and taken into consideration in 
of Husband to obtain a reduction 
such 
or other income as shall exceed the 
gross average monthly sum of Two Hundred Dollars. 
Both concede that this of the 
for modification of the court's support orders. Plain .. 
tiff contends, that the provision should be read as 
recognizing only a single ground for modification, namely. 
or other income obtained by plaintiff in excess of 
an average of $250 per month. The plain language of the 
provision, however, indicates that the parties contemplated 
modification upon an adequate showing of changed circum .. 
stances with a single limitation, that so long as plaintiff's 
earnings or other income did not exceed the monthly average 
of $250, any increase in her income would not be considered 
a changed condition. We conclude, therefore, that upon a 
proper showing of a material reduction in defendant's income, 
the trial court may in its judicial discretion modify its order 
requiring payments for the support of plaintiff and the child. 
[10] Plaintiff contends that a reduction in the amount of 
the payments for her support would violate a provision found 
in paragraph nine of the agreement, which reads: "Husband's 
obligation to pay said alimony to Wife shall cease upon her 
death or remarriage, except that in the case of her remarriage 
said payments shall be eon tinned until five ( 5) years from 
September 25, 1954, notwithstanding the fact that Wife may 
have remarried within said period of time.'' This provision, 
however, deals oniy with the termination of support payments, 
not with their modification. It provides only that "payments'' 
shall continue, and a reduction in the amount of the payments 
pursuant to paragraph ten will not violate its terms. 
The order dismissing defendant's application for modifica-
tion of the decree is reversed for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Gibson, C. Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
Shenk, ,T., and Schauer, ,J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, .J.-I dissent. 
The majority is inconsistent m itself as well as 
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with decisions of this court. In the case at bar it is 
by the majority, that the agreement under consideration 
was an property settlement which could 
not be modified unless the had to a modifica-
tion. Then it is held that the fact that the 
one eondition upon which the 
be modified, that defendant was entitled to a modification 
because his income had been redueed-a condition not men-
ioned in the 
for the modification of the 
as follows : '' :F'or purposes of this agreement no 
earnings of vVife or other income obtained by her shall be 
considered as a 'changed condition' and taken into considera-
tion in connection with any attempt of Husband to obtain a 
reduction in payment for support of \Vife or said child, John 
Daniel Plumer, except such portion of said eamings or other 
income as shall exceed the gross average monthly snm of Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00). 'Average Monthly' earn-
ings or income shall be computed on the lmsis of the total 
earnings or income of ·wife (other than Husband's payments 
to her) for the twelve months prior to the filing of Husband's 
petition for reduction divided by twelve.'' The agreement is 
eornpletely silent as to any other provision or stipulation for 
modification of the support payments to be made by the hus-
band. A majority of this court adds its own provision for 
modification to an admittedly integrated agreement and con-
cludes "that upon a proper showing of a material reduction 
in defendant's income, the trial court may in its judicial dis-
cretion modify its order requiring payments for the support 
of plaintiff and the child.'' That the support and mainte-
narwe provisions of the agreement were intended as a division 
of property is clearly shown by the provision in the agree-
ment that the payments to the wife shall continue until her 
remarriage bnt that notwithstanding her reman·iage the pay-
nw'lds are to be continued nntil five years from September 
19.)4. In other words the parties intended that the wife 
was to receive a certain sum of money whether or not she 
remarried. A more complete expression of the parties' inten-
tion as to the division of their property is difficult to imagine. 
The majority, sensing a need to gloss over its interference 
with the parties' agreement, tells us that the provision whereby 
plaintiff was to receive payments for five years from Sep-
tember 25, 1954, was a provision dealing "only with the 
termination of support payments, not with their modification. 
828 PLUMER V. PLUMER [48 C.2d 
It provides only that 'payments' shall continue, and a reduc-
tion in the amount of the payments pursuant to paragraph 
ten will not violate its terms.'' The parties contemplated 
only one reason for modifying the payments and that was if 
the plaintiff's separate income exceeded $250 exclusive of 
the payments made to her by defendant. A majority of this 
eourt has expanded the parties' agreement to inelude another 
reason-a reduetion in the defendant husband's income. 
I am firmly of the opinion that, in the absence of consent 
by the parties, a court has no power to modify an agreement, 
whether as to a division of their property or for the purpose of 
support, entered into by the parties when there has been no 
fraud, overreaching or undue influence. Anything said by me 
to the eontrary in the case of Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605 
[160 P.2d 15], is hereby expressly disapproved by me. In 
subsequent cases I have made my views dearly known (set-
eoncurring and dissenting opinions in Dexter· v. Dexter, 42 
Cal.2d 36, 44 [265 P.2d 873] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal.2d 49, 53 
[265 P.2d 881] ; Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55, 62 [265 P.2d 
865] ; Anderson v. Mart, 47 Cal.2d 274, 284 [303 P.2d 539] ; 
Herda v. Herda, ante, pp. 228, 235 [308 P.2cl 705] ; and 
eoneurring opinion in Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Cal.2d 619. 
630 [297 P.2d 988]). I feel that sinee the code ( Civ. Code, 
~§ 158, 159, 175) gives to the parties the right to contraet with 
eaeh other, their eontraet (in the absence of fraud or over-
reaching) should be aecorded the same dignity accorded 
other contracts. 
In Dexter v. Dexter, strpra, 42 Cal.2d 36, 42, a majority 
of this court there held : ''. . . the court cannot, after the 
interlocutory decree has become final, add a provision for ali-
mony or modify the amount of payments ordered pursuant to 
a property settlement agreement. Accordingly, if plaintiff 
was satisfied with her contract whereby she had made 
the support and maintenance provisions an integral part of the 
settlement of property rights and had tenable grounds for 
setting it aside, she should have attacked the agreement before 
the interlocutory decree was entered. She cannot, however. 
after having secured its approval by the court and having-
accepted the benefits thereof, now seek relief inc~onsistent with 
its terms." (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar the 
majority admits that the agreement involved was an integrated 
property settlement agreement. It is even admitted that a 
property settlement agreement containing support provisions 
cannot be modified in the absence of a provision in the agree-
July 1957] PLUMER v. PLUMER 
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ment providing for modification. Having paid lip service to 
prior decisions, the majority then writes in its own provision 
for modification. It is at once apparent that the majority 
holding in the case at bar is directly contrary to what was 
held and said in the Dexter case in the passage heretofore 
quoted. In the case at bar, defendant husband accepted the 
benefits of his bargain and now seeks to be relieved of the 
burdens. 
In Fox v. Fox, sttpra, 42 Cal.2d 49, 52, 53, a majority of 
this court said: ''. . . it is clear that the provisions for the 
support and maintenance of plaintiff are an integral and in-
severable part of the property settlement agreement of the 
parties." And "Similarly, the fact that the payments might 
be reduced under certain specified circttmstances does not 
indicate that they were alimony. Not only may the parties 
include such provisions in agreements that are admittedly 
solely property settlements (Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 
625, 628 [206 P. 79]), but the provision in this case lends 
support to the conclusion that at least part of the payments 
constituted a division of property as such. Thus in no event 
were the payments to fall below $200 per month, and they 
were to cease on a fixed date withmtt reference to plaintiff's 
needs or defendant's ability to pay after that time." (Em-
phasis added.) It should be recalled that in the case at bar 
plaintiff was to receive a definite sum regardless of her needs 
and regardless of defendant's ability to pay; and that the 
payments were to continue until a certain date regardless of 
plaintiff's remarriage. Only one specified condition was 
made for modification and that condition has not been met. 
In Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 Cal.2d 55, 60, a majority of 
this court held: "An examination of the property settle-
ment incorporated by reference in the interlocutory decree 
makes clear that it is an integrated bargain of the type con-
sidered in Dexter v. De.xter, ante, p. 36 [265 P.2d 873], and 
Fox v. Fox, ante, p. 49 f265 P.2d 881]. Accordingly, the 
provi~1:ons for monthly payments may not be modified con-
trary to its terms . ... Since the parti.cs have provided that 
the cmtrt may modify the payments ordered pursuant to the 
terms of their agreement, the court has jttrisdiction to do so in 
accordance with the agreern.ent." (Emphasis added.) It was 
concluded that the defendant might "renew his motion for 
a reduction in the monthly payments in accordance with the 
terms of the property settlement agreement any time the facts 
so jtrstify." 
PLVJ\IER 
It appears to me that it should be obvions to 
alike that the holding in the ease at bar 
inconsistent with the holding in the Flynn case. 
In , supra, 46 Cal.2d 619, a ma-
of this court held that " ... the pariies have made the 
for an of their settle. 
" 'I' hat "Plaintiff was entitled to agree ... 
division of the 
and maintenanee he 
rN1need." 1\nd that "\Vith sueh r:ondnsive evidence of 
support and maintenance or 
1'! the 
(Sec; Y. Plunn, supra, 42 Cal. 
61, and eases cited.) The r:onrt may not, 
'£nsert u.·hat has been omJttcd' (Code Civ. Proe., § 18i':i8) a.nrl 
Ill the clearly agreement of thG 
parties." (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar tl1is court 
has "inserted ·what has been omitted" and has, thereby, 
abrogated the "clearly expressed agreement of the parties"! 
So, again, the majority opinion is clearly inconsistent with 
its opinion in the Messenger case. 
Tn Anderson v. JYla.rt, supra, 47 Cal.2d 274, 279, a majority 
of this court, quoting from the Messenger case, held that 
the eonclusion was inescapable that the parties had made 
the proYision for thr wife's support an intrgral part of thr~ 
property settlement agreement. Tt was held that since the 
property settlement agreemrnt. made no provision for termi, 
nation of the support paymr~11ts to the wife and since thr 
partirs haa in aec:ordaner with t1wir agreement entered 
into a written modification of its terms, that the wife >vas 
PHi it h•d to rr(·oyrr from the lmshawl ':-; estate the present ,·ahw 
of the amount attributable io her support for the remainder 
of lwr life expcctan<'y. 'I'he majority hel(1, again quoting 
from the Messenger case, that " ... tbe provisions for sup-
port and maintenanee or alimony wonld be subject to modi-
fication only if the parties expressly so provided." The court 
refused to consider defendant's theory that the support pro-
visions were intended by the parties to end with the death of 
the payor and held that since there had been no written 
modification as provided for in the agreement the payments 
rlid not terminate. In the case at bar, no provision was made 
for modifi('Htion of the wife's support payments in thA event 
of a i!Aerease in the husband's ineome hut the majority of 
thi" ('onrt hns :mppliHl that omiAsion and has 
,J 19571 PLUMER Pr,uMER 
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v. Messenger·, 46 Cal.2d 619, 626 [297 P.2d 988] .) 
As I pointed out in my dissenting opinion in II erda v. 
Herda, supra, pp. 228, 235, the majority reached an 
different result on similar facts than was reached in 
the Anderson case. Here again it was held by the majority 
that the support payments were an integral and 
part of the property settlement agreement entered into be-
tween the parties. But even though no termination date was 
expressed in the agreement and even though no mention was 
made concerning the termination of the payments on the 
wife's remarriage or the death of the husband, a majority of 
this court held that ''Since the agreement in the present 
(•ase dealt primarily with support rights and the payments 
were described as for support and maintenance, it would be 
unreasonable to conclude that the agreement contemplated 
that the payments should continue for plaintiff's [wife's] 
benefit after the obligation to support the children had ter-
minated .... " (Emphasis added.) In both the Herda and 
Anderson cases where different results were reached the ma-
jority relies upon the Messenger case. Because there was no 
provision for the support payments to cease upon the hus-
band's death, the majority in the Anderson case held that 
plaintiff was entitled to recover from the husband's estate 
for the balance of her life expectancy; in the Herda case, 
even though there was no provision for the wife's support 
payments to cease on her remarriage, the majority held that 
"it would be unreasonable to conclude" that the parties had 
not intended such payments to cease when the wife remarried. 
As long as a majority of this court continues to rewrite 
the parties' agreements for them, add provisions which are 
not present, constitute itself the trier of fact and, in general, 
refuses to permit property settlement agreements to be en-
forced according to the rules applicable to other contracts, 
this state of ultimate confusion will exist in this field of the 
law in California. It is unfortunate that this court is the 
court of last resort in this field and that there is no higher 
authority to lay down a workable rule of law so that attorneys 
can, with some measure of certainty, advise their clients. 
I would affirm the order dismissing defendant's application 
for modification of the decree. 
